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Abstract 
The problems associated with scaling in­
volve active and challenging research topics 
in the area of artificial intelligence. The 
purpose is to solve real world problems by 
means of AI technologies, in cases where 
the complexity of representation of the real 
world problem is potentially combinatorial. 
In this paper, we present a novel approach 
to cope with the scaling issues in Bayesian 
belief networks for ship classification. The 
proposed approach divides the conceptual 
model of a complex ship classification prob­
lem into a set of small modules that work 
together to solve the classification problem 
while preserving the functionality of the ori­
ginal model. The possible ways of explain­
ing sensor returns (e.g., the evidence) for 
some features, such as portholes along the 
length of a ship, are sometimes combina­
torial. Thus, using an exhaustive approach, 
which entails the enumeration of all possi­
ble explanations, is impractical for larger 
problems. We present a network structure 
(referred to as Sequential Decomposition, 
SD) in which each observation is associated 
with a set of legitimate outcomes which are 
consistent with the explanation of each ob­
served piece of evidence. The results show 
that the SD approach allows one to 
represent feature-observation relations in a 
manageable way and achieve the same ex­
planatory power as an exhaustive approach. 
1 Introduction 
In the domain of ship classification there are potentially 
hundreds of candidate targets that can be observed. In 
the past several pilot studies [Booker 1988] [Musman, 
Chang & Booker 1993] have demonstrated the feasibili­
ty and applicability of using Bayesian belief networks 
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to solve the ship classification problem. However, that 
work only demonstrated small examples of how the 
problem can be solved. In both of the above cases the 
networks compared only 10-12 target types. 
Because of the large number of targets that are present 
in the ship classification problem, there are potential 
difficulties and pitfalls which exist when trying to scale 
up the example networks shown in the pilot studies to 
create a system which is capable of classifying the 
thousands of ship targets present in the world. At the 
moment there are more than 640 military combatant 
ship classes in the world and there are over 10,000 
types of Commercial and Auxiliary craft In our work 
we have focused on the task of identifying only the 
combatant targets. 
In order to be able to address such a large class prob­
lem we use the same coarse to fine hierarchical 
classification techniques described by [Clancy 1984] 
[Chandrasekaran 1986] by defining a taxonomy for the 
ship classification problem. In addition to this, because 
of the potential complexity problems which exist in 
creating belief networks (each associated with different 
levels of the hierarchy), we must also ensure that the 
internal structure of each network is properly designed 
so that it can address the scaling issues normally asso­
ciated with the addition of new targets or features. Ex­
amples of these two issues will be given. 
2 Overview 
Ship classification involves the use of more than 50 
features to differentiate between target classes. As with 
many other classification problems, often several target 
classes are very similar in appearance and additionally 
there can be a substantial variation of each individual 
target's specifics within the same target class. This 
latter characteristic of the problem is normally caused 
by making structural modifications or the addition of 
new weaponry after a ship has been deployed. 
Although there are several alternative ways in which to 
decompose the large problem into a hierarchical solu­
tion, we have endeavored to perform this operation in a 
manner that creates partial conclusions that have an in­
tuitive meaning to the analyst. While it is possible (and 
is sometimes appropriate) to create sub-conclusions in 
our taxonomy that are defined by the separability of the 
features it makes much more sense to relate the taxon­
omy ca�egories to information about the target that is 
indicative of its mission or military capability. Figure 1 
demonstrates the hierarchical breakdown of the ship 
classification problem from detection of a target on a 
radar PPI down to the target's naval class designation. 
At the upper levels of our taxonomy we normally as­
sign priors which reflect the fact that each possible tar­
get class is equally likely. This allows our problem 
solving to detect the target which best explains the ob­
served evidence. Such priors are not absolute and are 
not intended to indicate the actual frequency of oc­
currence of each target type in the world. Additionally, 
our priors are not considered to be firm and fixed. In­
stead they are expected to be tailored to match ea
.
ch 
specific mission scenario based on the effects of pnor 
intelligence and other activity associated with the area 
of the world being analyzed (i.e., in the Mediterranean 
you are less likely to come across a Chines� ship, or a 
specific class of targets may be known to be m port and 
under repair). These "prior" values are expected to be 
calculated using a separate belief network that is 
designed to fuse such information from diverse intelli­
gence reports. 
Belief networks are associated with each level of the 
taxonomy hierarchy. Each network uses appropriate 
features to attempt to diffurentiate between the hy­
potheses at that level. If the observed evidence can 
differentiate between the candidate hypotheses at the 
given level of the taxonomy then th� probl�m solving 
continues by loading a network assocmted WI�h the ne�t 
more specific level of the taxonomy. But, If the evi­
dence yields an inconclusive result then the problem 
solving is suspended and the most specific result o�­
tained from the taxonomy is returned to the user. This 
approach is described in more detail in [Musman, 
Chang & Booker 1993]. 
As a result of having many different networks associat­
ed with solving the problem, it is necessary to construct 
the networks to be modular. This will allow us to use 
the results from one network as a single piece of evi­
dence in another network, or will allow us to use the 
results of one network as priors in another network. 
This approach has advantages and disadvantages. An 
advantage of this approach is that the networks loaded 
into memory tend to be smaller and simpler than ne�­
works which address the whole problem. As a result 1t 
is possible to use dynamically computed measures of 
informativeness to efficiently order the acquisition of 
evidence [Pearl 1989][Musman, Chang & Booker 
1993]. The primary disadvantage of this modular ap­
proach is that the use of such informativeness measures 
is restricted to the single smaller networks. Thus, the 
ability to change the focus of attention is �uch �o:e 
limited than it could be. There is a trade-off m flex1btl-
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ity vs computation, that must be considered when creat­
ing the network modules. 
As a result of the large number of targets which must 
be modeled by our belief networks, if one were to build 
a network (or network modules) which compare each 
target to each other target type, there would be a large 
amount of duplicate structure within the network asso­
ciated with the fact that the targets are built of essen­
tially similar components (i.e. all targets have super­
structure mounted on the deck, etc.). This means that 
every time a target is added or deleted from such a net­
work it is necessary to add or delete all of the support­
ing structural links associated with that target. This 
makes such a network much harder to maintain (Figure 
2). 
To circumvent the above problem, we have chosen to 
utilize the fact that all ship targets have essentially the 
same structural makeup. Thus, the main difference 
between the targets is found in the details about how 
the features appear on the targets' components, and is 
not due to the fact that some targets have different 
components than others (i.e., all targets have both su­
perstructure and masts but the shapes of these features 
are different). By using this constraint, it is possible to 
create a single network which represents the structural 
makeup of a target (Figure 3). We then use this net­
work by adding evidence which indicates the errors 
between the observed evidence and a single specific tar­
get. 
In order to use the network shown in Figure 3 it is 
necessary to re-instantiate the network for each known 
target type by adding evidence which represents a 
measure of the error between the observed evidence 
and the expected description for each specific target. 
Thus, evidence is added to the network comparing the 
observations to targetl, the result is obtained, and then 
the process is repeated for each known target type. This 
network has two top level hypotheses: Target and Oth­
er. The "Target" hypothesis represents a known target 
type (which is perfectly described when there is no er­
ror between the observed evidence and the expected 
description). The "Other" hypothesis represents random­
ness where all of the errors are equally likely. A {T I 
0} network will be referred to here as T; -module, for 
i'th ship class. 
The advantage of using this approach to solving the 
ship classification problem is that we now obtain two 
pieces of information about each type of target: We ob­
tain a measure of how well the evidence matches the 
specific target type. This means that we can look at the 
final belief of the network to understand if the specific 
target being observed has been modified, or is somehow 
different from the prototypical example stored in our 
target database (i.e., this makes it possible to identify 
an unknown ship). It is still possible to compare the be­
liefs in target! vs target2, etc., to produce the probabili­
ty of {target l ,target2, .... targetN} exactly as would have 
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been calculated by the network shown in Figure 2. 
We will describe more details about using this approach 
later in the paper. 
3 Network Structure 
Under most conditions it is appropriate to use the belief 
at each node to compare candidate targets. There are 
however, certain conditions which can cause the value 
of belief to be other than what is desired. This condi­
tion occurs when there can be ambiguity associated 
with a single observation. When such ambiguity exists, 
the target hypothesis that contains the largest number of 
possible alternatives which may match the observation 
will be assigned the highest belief. While this assign­
ment of belief is correct, it is often found that the 
analyst is assured that the single observation can only 
match one of the possible outcomes (i.e., by being 
confident that he can identify the observation as being a 
single one and definitely not two coincident observa­
tions that may appear as one). When this happens, the 
result the analyst is expecting to see is one which com­
pares only the single best possible explanation for each 
hypothesis verSus the best explanation for each other 
hypothesis. In Bayesian belief networks this comparison 
of best explanations is called bel* and is defined in 
[Pearl 1989] as follows: bel* (x) = max p (x ,wx le) 
w_. 
where x stands for a variable, e stands for pieces of 
evidence and wx stands for the instantiation of all vari­
ables, except x, on the belief network. Therefore, to 
find the best explanation is to search for the variables' 
instantiations that maximize probability distributions. 
As an example of this phenomenon we propose the fol­
lowing example: 
It is often possible to identify ship targets at night by 
noting the number and location of portholes along the 
length of the target. Each porthole location is noted as 
a percentage location along the length of the target 
where the bow is 0% and the stern represents 100%. A 
typical measurement can be made in 10% intervals. 
This type of problem is hard to model using Bayesian 
belief networks because there are multiple causes for 
being able to observe a porthole along the length of the 
ship. Not only must a porthole be present at a specific 
location on the target for it to be observable, but also 
the lights inside of the porthole must also be illuminat­
ed This means that for a given target the first observed 
porthole location on any given night may the first, 
second, or third porthole present on that target, and so 
on for the remaining portholes. 
The easiest way in which to model this problem is to 
relate the number of lights observed with the number of 
lights on the target, and then exhaustively list out the 
possible permutations for how the lights on the target 
may be illuminated. This has the combinatorial 
behavior we mentioned earlier (Figure 4). 
The network used to solve the problem shown in Figure 
4 is interesting because it demonstrates the behavior 
and contrast of bel (i.e., the posterior probability 
evaluated from Bayesian belief network) and bel* for a 
given network node. If there are three targets, with the 
first having two portholes at 20% and 40% the ships 
length, the second having a single porthole at 40% and 
the third having two portholes at 50% and 70%. When 
given an observation located at 30% along the ships 
length, it is possible that this one observation can be 
caused by either the 1st or 2nd porthole on target-1, but 
could only be caused by the 1st porthole on target-2. 
No porthole on target-3 can possibly match this ob­
served porthole. If this single piece of evidence is en­
tered to the network the resultant belief at the Target 
node will correctly reflect the fact that target-1 is two 
times more likely than target-2 and Target-3 is 
discounted altogether (i.e., bel={0.66,0.33,0.0}). By 
contrast, the value of bel* reflects the fact that only one 
of the alternatives for target-1 can possibly match the 
single observation. This causes the bel* result to equal­
ly distribute its belief between target-1 and target-2 (i.e. 
bel*::::(O.S, 0.5, 0.0}). 
To make this example a little more interesting we now 
add an additional constraint. It states that at night from 
a long distance it is often possible to confuse an open 
deck hatch for a porthole. If this happens, then it be­
comes possible to have the very first light observation 
actually be caused by an open deck hatch rather than 
the 1st, 2nd or 3rd porthole on the target. To make this 
problem tractable we limit our example to only allow 
the observation of one incorrect detection (i.e., we will 
only allow one deck hatch to be observed). 
As an additional constraint to the above problem, we 
will now allow the observation of a single incorrect 
porthole location (i.e., we assume that an incorrect ob­
servation is an open deck hatch) without wanting to pe­
nalize our final belief. This means that a single correct 
observation should yield the same resultant belief as 
observing one correct observation and one incorrect 
observation. If we observe two incorrect features, then 
this can be considered to be a non-coincidenlal error 
and we will expect the resultant belief to exclude any 
target which has more than one incorrect observation. 
Figure 5 demonstrates a simple network that produces 
the desired result when the bel* value of the top level 
node is queried. It is deigned to allow up to three ob­
servations but allow one of them to be incorrect (i.e., 
not match anything on a target) without penalizing the 
bel* of that target. It is worthwhile to examine the bel* 
value response to the piece of evidence shown in Fig­
ure 6. While the results demonstrate that the network 
appears to return the desired results, it is necessary to 
re-examine the structural relationships within this net­
work to understand its scaling characteristics. 
For a simple demonstration of this, take the problem 
shown above as an example. Let the possible observa­
tions of porthole-1, porthole-2, porthole-3 and a phony 
object (e.g., hatch) be denoted as 1, 2, 3 and W, respec­
tively. Exhaustively listing all of the possible outcomes 
yields 23 of them: 
1,2,3,W, 
12,13,23,1W,2W,3W,Wl,W2,W3 
123,12W,l3W,23W,W12,W13,W23,1W2,1W3,2W3 
where one false detection of phony objects is allowed. 
This number is on the order of n! (where n is the 
number of features plus the number of false alarms). If 
we were to build a similarly structured network to solve 
a problem which would allow 6 observations and 2 
false detections (which is more commensurate with real 
world conditions) then we would need to exhaustively 
list out 846 possible outcomes! This becomes impracti­
cal. The calculation of the number of possible out­
comes is given in Appendix. 
To overcome this problem we have designed a different 
network structure that is intended to produce the same 
bel* as the above network, but without producing the 
scaling characteristic noted above. We have called the 
approach Sequential Decomposition (SD) (Figure 7). It 
works by imposing a different set of independence as­
sumptions about the observations than the above ex­
haustive approach. In this case the SD approach associ­
ates each observation only with legitimate outcomes. 
SD imposes on evidence from subsequent observations 
the constraints obtained from understanding the prelim­
inary reasoning about evidence for the first few obser­
vations. That is, constraints are explicitly represented in 
SD structure. As a result of this, for the 3-porthole, 1-
hatch problem we will have at most only seven possible 
ways of explaining observed pieces of evidence. The 
seven possible outcomes are {Wl, 2, W2, 3, W, NO, 
0} after two observations, where NO denotes a con­
straint violation which can only be resolved by having 
this observation "not observed" (NO), and 0 means all 
other ship classes. The conditional probability of an 
evidence node, for example, 0 1 given 2 has the same 
value as 0 1 given W2, because the "W" in W2 simply 
means the violation of constraint. ·is violated. Also, be­
cause of the meanings of 0 and W, conditional proba­
bilities of evidence nodes given 0 and W are assumed 
to be equally distributed. Note that 3 stands for 13 and 
23. Since bel* selects the best instantiation, it's possi­
ble to compress multiple outcomes into one outcome 
and preserve bel*. This property of bel* leads to the 
equivalence relationship between the exhaustive and SD 
networks representations: 
Property 1. The values of Bel*( Ti ) (Bel*(O)) com­
puted from Exhaustive and SD networks are equal. 
That is, SD has desirable scaling properties for the 
computation of bel*. If we were to build a network to 
solve the 6 porthole two hatch problem then we would 
Scaling Issues in Belief Networks 35 
only need 16 hypotheses for each node. This number is 
much better than the 846 hypotheses required in the ex­
haustive approach. 
While this new network is designed to produce the 
same value of bel* for any given set of observations 
(Figure 8), it is important to note that the bel values for 
the 2 networks are very different. This is because the 
independence assumptions for the evidence in each net­
work are different. Because of this, different ambigui­
ties exist in the different networks and it is these 
different ambiguities that cause the bel values to differ. 
In the case if the 3W problem described above, the 
difference between the exhaustive solution, and the SD 
solution is due to the fact that the exhaustive solution 
has a single node which explicitly states all of the net­
work constraints and can indicate exactly which obser­
vations match or violate the implicit constraints of the 
network. In contrast to this, the SD network deals with 
the constraints only on an observation by observation 
basis. Thus while a belief in the hypothesis "W3" for 
03-Alts implies that either observation 1 or observation 
2 is assumed incorrect, unlike the exhaustive network, 
it does not state which of the observations is incorrect. 
4 Integration of Belief Values 
Our proposed approach to scaling is designed to work 
by instantiating a single network which models only the 
structure of each target and utilizes evidence in the 
form of an error measure. A separate bel* value is ob­
tained for each target. The main advantage of using 
this approach is that it is very easy to add or delete tar­
gets to a classification system using this network be­
cause the network remains unaltered. The evidence ad­
ded to this network is in the form of an error between 
observation and specific target, and these error meas­
ures are computed by comparing the observed evidence 
to feature values stored in a database. This means that 
simple adding or deleting database entries for targets is 
sufficient for altering the number of targets in the sys­
tem. 
Computationally, because we really wish to enter evi­
dence to this network in a form which compares the 
probability that the observation is porthole-!, porthole-
2, etc., on each target, in our work we have created 
functions which compute these likelihoods by compar­
ing the observations to the database values. In doing 
this we have lost some of the characteristic benefits of 
using bi-directional inferences but have gained a sub­
stantial computational improvement. 
In addition to the scaling advantages associated with 
this technique, it is easier to understand and analyze the 
behavior of the network. This is because we explicitly 
model the errors associated with each distinct feature 
type. These error values are always compared with a 
random distribution (our "Other" hypothesis) and it is 
thus much easier to ensure that one feature type (or evi-
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dence source) does not carry more weight in the deci­
sion making process than another feature. This charac­
teristic can often be a significant problem when a sys­
tem combines evidence from a variety of different and 
diverse sources. 
Given a set of ship classes T 1o ••••• , Tn , the final deci­
sion for ship classification is based on integration of the 
results obtained from each individual module. Recall 
that, from earlier discussion, our decision is based only 
on observed evidence. Therefore, priors of Ti and 0 
are assumed to be equal ( though this technique can 
easily deal with unequal priors) in all Ti -modules. In 
a Ti -module, let the proportion of bel* ( Ti) : bel* (0) 
be denoted by ri The final decision of Ti is determined 
by comparing those ri s. In fact, if bel*( O) remains 
unchanged in different Ti -modules, then the mtio of 
r1 : •••••• rn is simply bel* ( T1) : •••... : bel*( Tn) , which 
is exactly the ratio without using the {T I 0} network 
model ( i.e., all target classes are in one node). We 
describe this result in the following Property: 
Property 2. The ratio of bel* of target classes, 
bel* ( T  1) : ...... : bel* ( Tn) , computed with using the {T 
I 0} network model is equal to that computed without 
using the {T I 0} network model. ( Proof is given in 
[Musman & Chang 1993].) 
Hypotheses can be rejected if there is no strong sup­
porting evidence for them. This fact can be manifested 
from the ratio of bel*'s between Ti and 0. That is, if 
the ratios of Ti -modules are smaller than 1, for all i, 
then a statement such as "Target is something else." 
can be concluded. 
When several features are evaluated, the method to cal­
culate bel* is carried out by direct multiplication. The 
evaluation process is a recursive procedure which 
evaluates each Ti -module in turn. 
In our system many of the conditional probability links 
contain subjective estimates of actual probability distri­
butions. These distributions are based on both our 
analysis of the results of a limited tmining cycle with 
real data and our own extrapolations about how the 
limited training results may extend to the rest of the 
problem domain. We thus encoumge a hybrid data­
driven and model-based approach to estimating the con­
ditional probability links. 
When estimating our conditional probabilities we res­
trict our estimation processes to the comparison of 
likelihoods for each possible hypothesis. This allows us 
the opportunity to better compare the impact of evi­
dence applied to each different hypothesis and thus al­
lows us to compute the better balance of evidential 
weight noted above. 
5 Discussion 
A detailed analysis of the performance of our approach 
has not been possible. Although many of the techniques 
described above have been implemented in a prototype 
system, this prototype system is intended to perform 
completely automatic classification of ship images 
[Musman, Kerr, Bachmann 1993]. The design goal of 
the automatic recognition system was to classify the 
ship targets by using the same characteristic features 
that are used by human interpreters. This approach was 
taken so that partial classification results can still be 
used by image analysts as a decision aid. As a result 
of our design goal we have used human interpreters as 
an initial model for the uncertainty associated with the 
extraction of target features. Not surprisingly, it has 
been found on many occasions that the automatic 
feature extraction procedures do not behave in the same 
manner as the human interpreters. This characteristic 
introduces additional errors into our system. As more 
data on the actual behavior of the automatic feature ex­
traction process is collected, the belief models can be 
updated to integrate the actual characteristics of the au­
tomatic feature extraction, rather than our original esti­
mates. 
Despite the problem of incorrectly modeling belief 
values for some of the the automatic feature extractors, 
the belief networks in the current prototype system 
have performed surprisingly well. On one occasion the 
results of the system did not match the ground truth in­
formation found in a log book which was supposed to 
indicate to us the correct target. After a detailed exami­
nation of the data, it was found that our classification 
system was correct and that the result found in the log 
was in error. 
One another occasion the system was able to come up 
with the correct target as being noticeably more certain 
than the other possible candidate targets still under con­
sideration after descending through the classification 
taxonomy. Even so, as a result of the two pieces of in­
formation we obtain about the observed evidence ( i.e. 
the belief of a known target type versus other known 
target types; and the belief of the known targets versus 
randomness as specified by the Ti modules) it was ap­
parent that the observed evidence did not exactly match 
the best of our known target types. The ratio of T I 0 
was noticeably smaller than it would have been if we 
had correctly described the target in our database, and 
the data quality was sufficiently good as to lead us to 
expect a better result. After some additional inspection 
of the test data, it was found that the image had been 
correctly identified but the ship under inspection had 
been modified by removing one of it's masts. 
6 Conclusion 
As with the previous studies, we have only been able to 
focus on a small portion of the ship classification prob­
lem. By combining the various techniques described 
separately in this and the previous papers, it is possible 
to create a target classification system which has the 
characteristics required for the ship classification prob­
lem. 
The combined techniques have been tested in a proto­
type system which perfmmed ship classification using 
approximately 15 features, for over 200 targets. While 
using 15 features wasn't normally enough to reliably 
accomplish complete classification, the final target rank­
ing based on the likelihood of bel* was very useful as a 
decision aid. 
Appendix : Complexity of the 6/2 Problem 
The number of possible outcomes for 6 observations 
with tolerance of 2 false detections is 846. Let W 
denote the false detection. This value is obtained as 
follows: 
Case 1. #( W)=O. 
If there is no false detection, the number of outcomes is 
63, i.e., 
C6t + C6z + c63 + c64 + C6s + c66· 
Case 2. #(W)= 1. 
The outcomes for one false detection are equal to 249, 
i.e., 
1 + 2 IT C61 + 3 IT C62 + 4 IT C63 + 
5 IT C64 + 6 IT C6s. 
Case 3. #(W)=2. In the case of two false detections, 
the number is 534, i.e., 
1 + (C22 + 2) IT C\ + (C32 + 3) IT C62 + 
(C4z + 4) IT C63 + (C5z + 5) IT C64. 
Summation of the three values yields 846. 
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Figure 1: Ship Classification Heierarchy 
Table 1: Target -> Bow 
S1 S2 53 
<25% 1.0 0.2 0.0 
c Target >=25% 0.0 0.8 1.0 
[Table 1 ] �able 2] 
w Stern Table 2: Target->Stern 
Sl S2 S3 
Round 0.7 0.1 0.2 
Curved 0.3 0.8 0.1 
Straight 0.0 0.1 0.7 
Figure 2: A simple network with 3 targets and 2 features. 
Note this networks does not allow dymanic addition/removal 
of a target. 
Table 3: Target -> Bow 
<25% 
S1 Other 
1.0 0.5 
0.0 0.5 
Table 4: Target->Stern 
Round 
Curved 
Straight 
S1 Other 
0.7 0.33 
0.3 0.33 
0.0 0.33 
Fi�re 3: A {TIO} network for the same features 
as m Fig 2. 
0 
0 
P1 H1 P2 P3 
Possible Interpretations for 2 lights: 
[P1,P2} {P1,P3} {P2,P3} {P1,H1} {H1,P2} {Hl,P3} 
Figure 4: This figure illustrates the exhaustive porthole 
solution. T he target is assumed to have 3 portholes (Pl, 
P2,P3) which may be illuminated. In addition to the 
porthole, this target also has an open hatch (Hl) which 
may appear like a porthole from a distance. 
{T,O} 
{ 1,2,3,W,l2,13,23,1W,2W,3W,Wl,W2,W3, 
123,12W,13W,23W,W13,W23,1W3,2W3} 
CS>z �� 
-�-- � ��---
_ 
_.__
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_
,2,3,W,O} �1,2,3,W,NO,O} {2,3,W,NO,O} 
Q.:) � 
For 01 the hypotheses are: { 10%,20%,30% ..... 90%} 
For 02,03 the hypotheses are: { 10%,20%, 30%, ..... . 90%, NOT-OBS} 
Figure 5: This figure illustrates the exhautive-3W 
Network which allows 3 observations and assumes 
the possibility of a single incorrect observation. 
If we observe a porthole which appears to be located 
about 20% of the length of the Target, our evidence 
might be the following likelihood ratios. 
{5:20:5: 1:1:1:1:1:1:1} 
The resultant Bel* value for this evidence would be: 
Bel*(T) = 0.778 
Bel*(O) = 0.222 
Figire 6: An example Bel* value obtained from adding 
evidence to the exhaustive-3w network shown in 
Figure 5. 
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{T,O} {1,2,3,W} 
� 
{1,2,3,W,O} • � {1,2,3,w,NO} 
�� r "-..... r {2.3.W,NO} 
���� 
{Wl,2,W2,W3,W,NO,NO,O} / � T 
� � / {W2,3,W3,W,NO,O} � 
Figure 7: This figure illustrates the SD network 
for the 3W problem. 
If we observe a porthole which appears to be located 
about 20% of the length of the Target, our evidence 
might be the following likelihood ratios. 
{ 5:20:5:1:1:1:1:1:1:1} 
The resultant Bel* value for this evidence would be: 
Bel*(T) = 0.778 
Bel*(O) = 0.222 
Figure 8: Bel* value as evaluated from the SD-3W 
network in Figure 7 when given the same evidence 
as in Figure 6. 
